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Abstract
As a response to the 2015 Chinese stock market crash, regulators prohibited arbi-
trage activities in the index futures and cash markets. We use this natural experiment
to test the hypothesis that liquidity and pricing efficiency causally affect each other.
We find that resulting shift in the arbitrage boundary led to the breakdown of the
two-way causality relation between liquidity and the absolute futures-cash basis. We
thus confirm that the relation between liquidity and the absolute futures-cash basis is
not driven by the omitted variable bias, but is indeed due to arbitrage.
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1 Introduction
The law of one price is the economic theory that two traded or synthesized instruments with
the same future cash flows should trade at the same price due to arbitrage trades. The
effectiveness of arbitrage in enhancing pricing efficiency should depend on liquidity. Roll,
Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2007) test this notion by comprehensively investigating the
intertemporal association between stock market liquidity and the absolute futures-cash basis
in the context of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) index futures/cash markets. Using
a vector autoregressions (VAR) approach, they find that the innovations to the absolute
futures-cash basis and spreads are positively correlated, and there is a positive two-way
Granger causality relation between them. The underlying mechanism of this phenomenon,
as surmised by Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2007), is that a liquid market would
facilitate arbitrage trades and then eliminate market mispricing, while the arbitrage triggered
trades in response to a wide futures-cash basis could also reduce liquidity due to order
imbalances.1 This two-way relation also exists in the international markets (e.g., Lee, Chien,
and Liao, 2012; Kadapakkam and Kumar, 2013).
However, there remains one potential issue in Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2007)
and other relevant studies, which is the “omitted variable bias.” Testing if and how market
liquidity and the absolute futures-cash basis interacts with each other poses a tricky identi-
fication challenge. According to Granger (1980), Lu¨tkepohl (1982), and Stock and Watson
(2001), among others, the results on Granger causality could be spurious or measure wrong
feedback relations, if as is likely, there are omitted variables (such as interest rate, market
volatility, and market sentiment, etc. in our context)2 that simultaneously affect liquidity
and the absolute futures-cash basis. In our context, to overcome the potential for omitted
1The interplay between market efficiency and liquidity is an enduringly important research question in
the financial economics literature. For instance, Kumar and Seppi (1994) point out, arbitrage activities,
and hence, the futures-cash basis, may be affected by liquidity. In the reverse direction, market-wide order
imbalances resulting from arbitrage trades may have a contemporaneous and a persistent impact on liquidity
(e.g., Stoll, 1978a; O’Hara and Oldfield, 1986; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2002).
2For instance, numerous theoretical and empirical studies have demonstrated the role volatility plays in
driving illiquidity (e.g., Stoll, 1978b, 2000; Amihud and Mendelson, 1989; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam,
2001; Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam, 2005), while Chen, Cuny, and Haugen (1995) document that
stock market volatility is a key determinant of the index futures-cash basis.
variable bias, the commonly used approaches in the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression,
i.e., instrument variables or exogenous shocks to independent variable(s), can prove difficult
since we have two series of lagged independent variables.3
In this study, we formally test whether the interplay between liquidity and the absolute
futures-cash basis is caused by the forces of arbitrage. We employ a natural experiment to
“shut down” the driving force (arbitrage activities) and test whether the two-way relation
between liquidity and the futures-cash basis still holds or not. Specifically, recent trading
restrictions on short sales and index futures trading in the Chinese financial markets provide
us with an ideal laboratory setting for such an identification strategy.4 As a response to the
Chinese stock market crash starting in the middle of June 2015, since July 2015, regulators
successively restricted the positions for the “speculation or arbitrage” purpose in the index
futures market by limiting the number of trades and sharply increasing the transaction costs
and margin rates. Regulators also de facto banned short positions in the stock market.5
Under these restrictions, arbitrage trades, which need to set up simultaneous positions in
both markets and are sensitive to transaction costs, are in fact infeasible. Hence, in this
restriction experiment, the positive two-way relation between the absolute futures-cash basis
and illiquidity should break down if their relation is indeed due to the arbitrage activities
other than the endogeneity problem.
We first investigate the relation between the Chinese Securities Index 300 (CSI 300)
absolute futures-cash basis and the aggregate liquidity of the CSI 300 using the VAR ap-
proach and impulse response analysis for the sample period from January 2, 2012 to May
29, 2015 (a half month before the market crash). In this pre-restriction period, results are
in line with the findings in both U.S. and international markets: the absolute futures-cash
basis and market illiquidity have a positive two-way causality relation both statistically and
3Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2007) mention the possible existence of the omitted variable bias
and control for volatility and signed index returns, the possible common drivers, in the VAR estimation.
However, as it is impossible to control for all the known and unknown factors in one system, we adopt a
different identification strategy based on the economic mechanism behind the statistical relation.
4Stock and Watson (2001) also suggest that, although not commonly used in the literature, the natural
experiment approach could be a remedy for the omitted variable bias problem in the Granger causality test.
5We provide a more detailed introduction of this restriction experiment in Section 2 and Appendix A.
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economically, and the results are stronger for the effective spread measure compared to the
quoted spread measure, possibly due to the fact that the effective spread is a more accurate
estimate of arbitrage cost (Blume and Goldstein, 1997).
We next examine the sample period that covers the quasi-natural experiment (July 7,
2015 to June 30, 2016). We find that the significant two-way causality relation in the
pre-restriction period disappears in this restriction period for all the futures contracts. The
impulse response analyses also show that shocks to spreads (bases) are uninformative towards
the future movements of bases (spreads) and the mean values of response are statistically
different from those in the pre-restriction period. The insignificant impulse responses also
reveal that the economic significance of the cross-effects between liquidity and the futures-
cash basis is negligible. To ensure the robustness, we also use a more strict definition for
the restriction period (August 3, 2015 to June 30, 2016), and the results are qualitatively
unaltered. Moreover, we use the Z-test to statistically compare the VAR coefficients in
the two sample periods (pre-restriction and restriction) and the results indicate that the
coefficients are significantly different between these two sample periods. Overall, our results
confirm the hypothesis that arbitrage is the underlying mechanism that drives the interplay
between spreads and the futures-cash basis.
One remaining concern for our central conclusion is the market crash effect. Lien et al.
(2013) argue that when market liquidity decreases and the absolute futures-cash basis in-
creases (a typical phenomenon during the 2015 Chinese market crash), the dependence struc-
ture between these two variables may break down. Since our restriction period overlapped
the Chinese market crash period, our treatment effect (restriction) might therefore be con-
founded by the market crash effect that can potentially provide explanatory power for our
results. To alleviate this concern, we first conduct a Granger causality test in the post-crash
sample period from September 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016. The relation between spreads and
the absolute futures-cash basis, however, is still insignificant for this stable period in the
market. Second, we use the Hang Seng China Enterprise Index (HSCEI)6 in the Hong Kong
6The HSCEI was established on October 3, 2001, based on companies listed in Hong Kong but registered
in mainland China (“H” shares). This index comprises the 40 largest and most liquid H shares.
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Stock Exchange (HKEx) as a control group. Since the variation in “H” shares’ stock prices
reflects operating information in mainland China, the HSCEI is highly integrated with the
mainland China stock markets. As a result, during the 2015 Chinese stock market crash,
the HSCEI also experienced severe turmoil. However, in contrast to mainland China, there
is no trading restriction imposed on either the futures or cash markets in Hong Kong. We
find that a positive two-way relation prevails in both pre-restriction and restriction periods
in the Hong Kong market. Collectively, our findings effectively rule out the likelihood that
the treatment effect in the restriction period is driven by the market crash effect.
Our study contributes to two strands of literature. First, this paper complements and
extends, both methodologically and substantively, a rigorous analysis of the relation between
liquidity and the futures-cash basis. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study
that formally addresses the omitted variable bias problem in the bulk of the literature on
this topic. Based on a novel identification strategy, we conclude that the interplay between
liquidity and pricing efficiency is “casual” other than “correlated” and confirm that arbitrage
is indeed the underlying mechanism.
Second, our paper also joins the literature on the consequences of regulations during a
market crash. Using the 2007-2009 global financial crisis as a natural experiment, researchers
have mainly focused on the impact of short selling bans on liquidity and pricing efficiency
separately across different markets (e.g., Boulton and Braga-Alves, 2010; Beber and Pagano,
2013; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2013; Trebbi and Xiao, 2015). Focusing on the recent
2015 Chinese market crash, we tackle the real effects of regulations on liquidity and market
efficiency jointly. We utilize the restrictions in both futures and stock markets in China
and document that the regulations triggered arbitrage constraint shuts down the interaction
between liquidity and market efficiency during and after the 2015 Chinese market crash.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We provide the institutional background in
Section 2. In Section 3, we describe the variable construction methods and outlines our data.
In section 4, we present the empirical results. Concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
4
2 Institutional background
In this section, we focus on introducing the institutional background of the natural exper-
iment, including the 2015 Chinese market crash, the short sale bans in the stock market
and the trading restrictions in the index futures market, and the uniqueness of this Chinese
regulatory experiment comparing to the regulation shocks in other markets.
As shown in Figure 1, after a sharp rise from the middle of March to the middle of
June, the Chinese stock market started to crash on June 15, 2015 and in the consecutive 17
trading days, the CSI 300 index dropped from 5335.11 to 3663.04, or 31.34%. After three
stable weeks, the CSI 300 index collapsed again on August 24, falling 8.49%, marking the
largest decline since 2007, and continued to drop by 7.63% on August 25.7 Since September
1, the market started to improve and became steady. By the end of December 2015, the
CSI 300 index had recovered from the crash and outperformed the S&P 500 Index for 2015.
In the first week of 2016, on both January 4 (Monday) and January 7 (Thursday), trading
in the Chinese stock market and index futures market was halted after a 7% drop in the
CSI 300 index from the time markets opened because of the newly issued circuit-breaker
rule.8 Regulators suspended the circuit-breaker rule on January 8.9 In January, the CSI
300 index decreased by 17.74%. Beginning in February, the Chinese stock market slowly
recovered from the panic caused by the circuit-breaker rule and the CSI 300 index has
remained around 3,200. As of October 24, 2016, the CSI 300 index is at the level of 3367.58.
< Insert Figure 1 here >
During the 2015 Chinese crash period (June 15, 2015 to August 31, 2015), the index
futures trading was commonly blamed by the public as the catalyst for the market decline.10
7These two days are known as “Black Monday and Tuesday.” Since there is a 10% downside limit in the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets, a drop of 8.49% means that the majority of the stocks in the market
had hit the limit ban.
8The complete trading session on Thursday lasted only 29 minutes, including a
15-minute halt in trading that was triggered after an initial 5% drop in the in-
dex. See a related report at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-07/
china-s-29-minutes-of-chaos-stunned-brokers-and-a-race-to-sell.
9We remove the first week of January 2016 from our sample due to the consideration that the measurement
of futures-cash basis and spreads would be inaccurate in these extremely short-ended sessions.
10See a related report at: http://english.caixin.com/2015-09-09/100847961.html.
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Beginning on July 7, 2015, a bundle of policies were implemented by regulators to restrict
speculative contracts in index futures and other shorting behaviors.11 In the Chinese index
futures market, all the futures positions are divided into two groups: hedging positions
and speculative positions. To open hedging positions, investors should apply to the China
Financial Futures Exchange (CFFEX), and the number of contracts they can open is limited
to cover their long-term stock investments. Typically, hedging positions are opened by
institutional investors such as mutual funds and brokers. All other positions are classified by
the regulators as speculative positions, which include positions for arbitrage and speculative
purposes.
The policies for the futures market are designed to primarily restrict speculative positions,
while hedging positions are only slightly influenced (increasing margin rate from 10% to 20%).
Currently, the restrictions on speculative positions include limiting the number of opening
contracts to no more than 10 per day per investor, increasing the margin rate to 40% (which
was 10% before) and increasing transaction cost to 0.230% (which was 0.005% before). In
Appendix A, we further discuss these policies.
Without official announcements, short selling is de facto frozen in the Chinese stock
market. In Figure 2, we plot the daily volume of short selling, with the data obtained from
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Since July 7, 2015, the trading volume dropped
dramatically. On August 4, 2015, regulators changed the trading rule for short sales from
“T +0” to “T +1”, which the market interpreted as a signal to comprehensively restrict short
selling. It is evident that starting from that date, trading volume is negligible compared to
the pre-restriction period. Trading restrictions for both markets dramatically increase the
cost of arbitrage and make them infeasible, which provides an ideal quasi-natural experiment
to identify the channel underlying the relation between liquidity and the futures-cash basis.12
11See related reports at: http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2015/
07/07/content_281475142013234.htm and http://www.reuters.com/article/
china-markets-futures-idUSB9N0VJ02P20150826.
12Trading restrictions, especially the short selling ban, could lead to increased volatility (e.g., Boulton and
Braga-Alves, 2010; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2013). In untabulated results, we also control for volatility
and the results remain qualitatively the same. Therefore, our identification strategy would not be confounded
by the volatility effect.
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< Insert Figure 2 here >
During the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, most regulators around the world imposed
bans or constraints on short sales, either for financial stocks only or for the entire stock market
(Beber and Pagano, 2013). As recently as 2011 and 2012, Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain
imposed renewed short selling restrictions on stocks. Even though without restrictions on
the index futures market, restrictions on short sales in the cash market would also prohibit
the arbitrage trades in the presence of negative futures-cash basis, thus making our testing
strategy possibly feasible in these markets. However, compared to other markets, the Chinese
stock and futures markets provide a better laboratory setting for our research question.
First, the index futures market in China is active and has a large trading volume. In
2014, the trading volume of the CSI 300 futures contracts was more than 216 million and
ranked in the top-10 worldwide Equity Index Futures & Options Contracts by the Futures
Industry Association.13 In July 2015, the China Financial Futures Exchange was ranked by
the World Federation of Exchanges as the most active market for index futures.14 Among
all the markets that issued short selling bans, only the U.S. and Japanese markets have
comparable futures trading volumes. Second, the restrictions in the Chinese market are
comprehensive. Since July 2015, regulators in China restricted transactions on both the
futures and stock markets. In other markets, the index futures trading was unaffected. For
short sales in the stock market, some market restrictions only applied to financial stocks (e.g.,
U.S., U.K., Canada, and South Korea) instead of the entire market or were only in the form
of a naked ban other than a covered ban (e.g., Japan, Spain, Switzerland, and Italy). Under
these circumstances, arbitrage in the futures/stock market is still possible. For instance,
Karmaziene and Sokolovski (2015) show that short selling equity ETFs was a viable method
of circumnavigating the ban in the U.S. market and they estimated that close to $5.5 billion
new short positions were established using the ETFs. Third, the trading restriction period
in China is long and covers both a market crash period and a more settled period, thus
alleviating the concern that our results may be driven by a market crash. In summary,
13https://fimag.fia.org/.
14http://www.world-exchanges.org/.
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to the best of our knowledge, China might be the only market that can satisfy all three
conditions: (i) active with large trading volume, (ii) incurring comprehensive restrictions,
and (iii) having a sufficiently long restriction period. All these three conditions are crucial
for our identification strategy to be feasible and effective.
3 Data
In this section, we introduce the data sources and explain the methods used to construct the
futures-cash basis and liquidity measures. Our analysis focuses on the CSI 300 cash index
and the CSI 300 index futures. The CSI 300 index was initiated by the China Securities
Index Company Ltd on April 8, 2005 to measure the performance of the aggregate Chinese
stock market. It consists of the top 300 stocks with the largest market capitalization from
the Shanghai Stock and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, the total value of which accounts for
70% of the total market capitalization of these two markets. To provide investors with a
hedging instrument, the China Financial Futures Exchange introduced index futures against
the CSI 300 index on April 16, 2010.15
3.1 Futures-cash basis
Following MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988), the absolute value of the relative index futures
basis (henceforth, ABAS) can be defined as:
ABAS =
∣∣∣Fe−(r−δ)t − S∣∣∣
S
, (1)
where F is the index futures price; S is the cash stock market index; r is the risk-free rate
over the remaining life of the contract; t is the time to contract expiration; and δ is the
dividend yield over the contract’s remaining lifetime.
Specifically, the absolute futures-cash basis is empirically constructed with the following
components: F is the daily closing futures price on the CSI 300 index futures contract, while
15For details about the CSI 300 index and the CSI 300 index futures market, see Yang, Yang, and Zhou
(2012).
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S is the daily closing value of the CSI 300 index.16 The risk-free rate r is the Shanghai
Interbank Offered Rate (SHIBOR) maturing as close to the futures expiration date as pos-
sible.17 The dividend yield δ is the (continuously compounded) difference between the CSI
300 total return index and the CSI 300 index. All the data used in constructing the absolute
futures-cash basis are obtained from Datastream.
The expiration day of the CSI 300 index futures contracts is the third Friday of the
contract (delivery) month. Contract (delivery) months include the current month, next
month, and the final months of next quarter and next two quarters, which are called quarter-
months. We plot the daily trading volumes of these four contracts from January 2, 2012 to
June 30, 2016 in Figure 3. As clearly shown, the current-month contract has the highest
trading volume and the contracts for the final months of next quarter and next two quarters
are inactively traded with volumes negligible compared to the other two contracts. Therefore,
we focus only on the first two contracts in the following analysis.
< Insert Figure 3 here >
We construct two absolute futures-cash basis series by starting with a contract with
certain months to maturity and rolling over into a successive contract at the reset date with
the same original time to maturity. We name these two basis series as current-month basis
(ABAS1 ) and next-month basis (ABAS2 ).
3.2 Liquidity measures
Following Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2007), we use two cost-based liquidity mea-
sures for each stock, quoted spread and effective spread, and these spreads are not scaled by
16There is a slight asynchronicity between the hours of operation of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock
Exchanges and the China Financial Futures Exchange (where the futures contracts trade). Specifically, while
both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges operate from 9:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m., and then from 1:00
p.m. to 3:00 p.m.(Beijing time), the trading hours of the China Financial Futures Exchange are from 9:15
a.m. to 11:30 a.m., and from 1:00 p.m. to 3:15 p.m. (Beijing time). According to Roll, Schwartz, and
Subrahmanyam (2007), although this asynchronicity will introduce some measurement errors in the basis, it
should not affect the statistical inferences. To ensure the robustness, we also use the intraday trading data
of the CSI 300 index futures contracts from TRTH to obtain the futures price at 3:00 pm. The untabulated
results show that our conclusion remains the same.
17The maturities for SHIBOR we use are overnight, 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, and 3 months.
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price to avoid attributing variations in stock prices to variations in liquidity. These are two
widely used liquidity measures in both short-horizon and long-horizon liquidity research.18
For a given stock, the quoted spread for the sth time interval is defined as:
Quoted Spreads = Asks −Bids, (2)
where Asks and Bids are the best ask and bid quotes for the s
th time interval. The daily
quoted spread, Quoted Spreadi, is the time-weighted average of Quoted Spreads computed
over all the time intervals within trading day i.
For a given stock, the effective spread for the kth trade is defined as:
Effective Spreadk = 2|Pk −Mk| , (3)
where Pk is the price of the k
th spread and Mk is the midpoint of the consolidated Best Bid
Offer (BBO) prevailing immediately prior to the time of the kth trade. Daily effective spread,
Effective Spreadi, is the volume-weighted average of Effective Spreadk computed over all the
trades within trading day i.
Daily spread measures are averaged and value-weighted, across stocks (with weights pro-
portional to market capitalizations of the tradable shares at the end of last month19) to
obtain the aggregate market illiquidity measures.
To construct these two liquidity measures, we obtain intraday trades and quotes data of
all the constituents of the CSI 300 index from the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH)
database, which is supplied by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific
(SIRCA). TRTH is a survivor-bias-free database that contains historical Reuters data feeds
beginning January 1996 on over 5 million instruments from various exchanges. Fong, Holden,
and Trzcinka (2014) documents that TRTH is a comparable database for the international
18Since our study focuses on a daily basis, we do not use the other commonly used liquidity measures,
including the price impact measure of Amihud (2002), which typically measures liquidity over a relatively
long time period. For a recent comprehensive review on liquidity measures, see Holden, Jacobsen, and
Subrahmanyam (2014).
19Here we use the market value of tradable shares other than the total market value as it is hard to measure
the market value of non-tradable shares accurately. See Li et al. (2011) for more detailed discussions on the
tradable and non-tradable shares in China.
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markets to that of the Trade and Quote (TAQ) for the U.S. market in terms of liquidity
research.
We collect the CSI 300 index composition information from TRTH and adjust the sample
of individual stocks for the aggregate liquidity measures whenever there is any adjustment
in the CSI 300 index composition.
3.3 Summary statistics
We report the summary statistics of the absolute futures-cash bases and spreads in Table
1. In Panel A, we find that in the pre-restriction period, the mean values of the absolute
futures-cash bases increase monotonically along the maturities, indicating the possible pres-
ence of arbitragers in the Chinese market as short-term contracts are more actively traded.
The mean value of quoted spread (0.014 CNY (Chinese yuan)) is lower than that of effective
spread (0.020 CNY). This is because in China the security trading scheme is order driven
instead of market making. As shown in Panel B, in the restriction period, the mean values
of the absolute futures-cash bases increased dramatically for both the current-month and
next-month futures contracts. For instance, for the current month contract, the mean per-
centage absolute basis in the pre-restriction period is close to zero (0.407%), reflecting the
effectiveness of arbitrage activities, while in the restriction period, it is as high as 2.083%.
The high level of absolute basis is consistent with our argument that in the restriction period,
arbitrage activities were prohibited and the pricing gap thereby cannot be closed. Consistent
with the observations in the other markets, market liquidity strains during a market crash.
Comparing Panel A with Panel C, it is evident that the spread measures increased dramat-
ically during the 2015 Chinese stock market crash period. For instance, the mean value of
the effective spread rises 35% from 0.020 CNY to 0.027 CNY. Considering that the CSI 300
index dropped more than 36% in the crash period, the percentage-based spread measures
increased even more. In Panel D, we can observe that the level of market liquidity recovers
to some extent after the market crash with mean values of spread measures close to those in
the pre-restriction period.
< Insert Table 1 here >
11
We also plot the dynamics of the futures-cash bases and two spread measures in Figures
4 and 5. During the restriction period, the futures-cash bases were generally negative and
with large magnitudes, and spreads increased sharply. In the restriction period, the least
restricted position in the futures market was the hedging position and short selling in the
cash market was frozen. As a result, the high magnitude of negative futures-cash bases as
shown in Figure 4 might largely reflect the premiums investors were willing to pay in the
futures market to hedge their long positions in the cash market.
< Insert Figure 4 and Figure 5 here >
Futures-cash basis and spread measures show calendar regularities and time trends (e.g.,
Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen, 1992). To address this issue, following Roll, Schwartz, and
Subrahmanyam (2007) and Kadapakkam and Kumar (2013), we adjust the raw absolute
futures-cash bases and spreads by controlling for the weekday effect, monthly effect, pre-
and post- holiday effects, and linear and quadratic time trends. For bases, we also control
for the time to maturity. The residuals from these regressions are then used in the analysis.
Table 2 reports the pair-wise correlation matrix among two adjusted futures-cash basis
measures (ABAS1 and ABAS2 ) and two spread measures (QSPR and ESPR) in the pre-
restriction period and restriction period in Panels A and B respectively. In the pre-restriction
period, all correlations are positive and significant at the 1% level. The two absolute basis
measures are highly correlated, and the two spread measures are also significantly related.
In addition, the correlations of the bases with spreads are all positive. In contrast, we find
that in Panel B, the positive correlations of the bases with spreads disappear. This finding
indicates a potential structural break during the restriction period.
< Insert Table 2 here >
4 Results
In this section, we first show that the general pattern of the relation of the futures-cash
basis and liquidity in the pre-restriction period (January 2, 2012 to May 29, 2015). Then,
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to address the omitted variable bias, we adopt a natural experiment identification design
and test their relation in the restriction period (July 7, 2015 to June 30, 2016). Finally, to
provide further evidence that our conclusion is not driven by the market crash effect, we also
conduct a sub-sample analysis and use the Hong Kong market as a control group.
4.1 Results in the pre-restriction period
In this section, the sample period is from January 2, 2012 to May 29, 2015. Our analysis
mainly relies on the vector autoregressions (VAR) model, which provides evidence with a
rich dynamic structure. The vector we use mainly includes two variables: adjusted absolute
bases and adjusted quoted spread (or adjusted effective spread). The number of lags is
chosen as the minimum of the values selected by Akaike and Schwarz information criteria,
which is four in our case. Four VARs are estimated, pairing each of the two adjusted absolute
bases (two futures contracts for current month and next month) with two spread measures
(adjusted quoted spread and adjusted effective spread).
The VAR model that captures the joint dynamics of bases and spread measures can be
expressed as:
yt =
4∑
i=1
αiyt−i +
4∑
j=1
βjxt−j + t, (4)
where y represents the column variable, while x represents the row variable and  denotes
the residuals. The null hypothesis is that row variable does not Granger-cause the column
variable. Hence, it is a joint test of whether all βj equal to 0.
Panel A in Table 3 reports the F-statistics of all the pairwise Granger causality tests.
The results show that ABAS1 and ABAS2 highly significantly Granger-cause QSPR and
ESPR, suggesting that arbitrage forces, triggered by the futures-cash bases, lead to inventory
imbalance and strain the liquidity in the stock market. In the other direction, ESPR also
Granger-causes the absolute bases, especially for the next-month contract, indicating that
illiquidity does impede pricing efficiency. The stronger effect for the longer-term contracts
is consistent with the findings in Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2007), in which they
argue that liquidity concerns are more relevant for arbitrageurs in longer-term, relatively
13
less-active contracts. In contrast to ESPR, the effects of QSPR on bases are not found to be
significant. This observation is largely in parallel with Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam
(2007), suggesting that effective spread, which accounts for transactions executing within
and outside the quotes (Blume and Goldstein, 1997), is a more relevant estimate of arbitrage
cost.
< Insert Table 3 here >
To have a clear picture of the Granger causality relation, we also conduct impulse response
analyses. An impulse response function (IRF) depicts the current and future responses of
endogenous variables to a one-time, unit standard deviation, positive shock to one of the vari-
ables. We use the inverse of the Cholesky decomposition of the residual variance-covariance
matrix to orthogonalize the impulses. Figures 6 and 7 present the impulse responses of the
cross effects between the absolute futures-cash basis and spread. Monte Carlo simulations
(1,000 replications) are applied to get the 95% confidence intervals of the responses.20
< Insert Figure 6 and Figure 7 here >
In Figure 6, for the responses of QSPR to ABAS1, consistent with the Granger causality
result, a shock to the current-month absolute futures-cash basis has a significantly positive
and persistent effect on the adjusted quoted spread. Meanwhile, even though QSPR does
not Granger-cause absolute bases, after accounting for the joint dynamics by including the
persistence of the absolute basis and liquidity variables, a shock to QSPR also leads to a
higher absolute futures-cash basis. As shown in Figure 6, the cross-effect of ESPR and
ABAS1 exhibits a similar pattern. For the next month contract (Figure 7), we find both
spreads (bases) shocks are informative towards future movements of bases (spreads). The
results in the impulse response analysis reinforce our findings in the Granger causality test.
Next, we gauge the economic significance in a similar way to that of Roll, Schwartz,
and Subrahmanyam (2007).21 Specifically, we measure economic significance using both
20To save space and make the main results more clearly presented, we leave the impulse responses of bases
(spreads) to their own shocks in the Online Appendix Figures A1-A4. The results show that these responses
decay overtime, indicating that these variables are stationary.
21By doing so, we can also compare the results in the pre-restriction period and the restriction period
economically. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
14
CNY value and percentage. When the response variable is QSPR (or ESPR), the economic
significance in terms of CNY value is the annualized extra trading cost of a daily round-
trip trade of one million shares in the basket of CSI 300 stocks caused by a one standard
deviation shock from ABAS1 (or ABAS2 ); the economic significance in terms of percentage
for spread is measured as extra trading cost over the average total trading cost. When the
response variable is ABAS1 (or ABAS2 ), the economic significance in terms of CNY value
is the annualized extra divergence between the futures and its cash value for a trade of one
million shares of a 40 CNY stock, caused by a one standard deviation shock from QSPR (or
ESPR); the economic significance measured in percentage is the extra divergence value over
the average total divergence value. The specific formulas for these measures are in the Note
portion of Table 4. Information used to calculate these measures is from Panel A in Table 1
and Figures 6 and 7.
We summarize the results with respect to the economic significance of the IRFs in Table
4. As shown, for a daily round-trip trade of one million shares of CSI 300 stocks, a one
standard deviation shock from ABAS1 impacts ESPR and aggregates to an annualized
extra trading cost of 0.1375 million CNY (or 2.75% of the average total trading cost). A
value of 2.75% is non-trivial and close to the effect of three-month absolute basis on the
ESPR in the U.S. market (3%) as reported in Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2007,
p. 2022). The effect is stronger for the other way around. When the response variable is
ABAS1, a one standard deviation shock from ESPR can bring extra an annualized 4 million
CNY divergence between the futures and cash value for a trade of one million shares of a 40
CNY stock. This is equivalent to 9.8% of the average total divergence value, which is about
1.67 times of the effect of ESPR on the three-month absolute basis in the U.S. case. In line
with the findings in Table 3, when ABAS2 is considered, the percentage value can increase
to around 16%, reflecting that arbitragers in longer-term (less active) contracts suffer more
from the liquidity shock.
< Insert Table 4 here >
Overall, our results indicate that there exists a two-way positive relation between spreads
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and the absolute futures-cash bases in the Chinese market both statistically and economically,
and are thus consistent with the findings in Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2007) and
Kadapakkam and Kumar (2013) for the U.S. and Indian markets.
4.2 Results in the restriction period
We define two restriction periods with different starting points. First, although the official
announced restriction polices on the CSI 300 index futures trading took place on August
3, 2015, on July 7, 2015 it was reported that opening speculating positions on CSI 300
index futures may be rejected without any notification.22 Moreover, arbitragers need to hold
opposing positions in both markets. Restrictions that sharply increase the cost of arbitrage
in one market would largely impede the arbitrage activities. Since the restrictions on the
short selling of stocks started July 7, 2015, we define the first restriction period as being
from July 7, 2015 to June 30, 2016.23
Second, August 3, 2015 is the day that regulators announced the restrictions on futures
trading for the CSI 300 index futures. One day later (August 4, 2015), it was announced
that the short selling scheme was switched from “T +0” to “T +1.” Henceforth, we use a
more strict definition of restriction period (August 3, 2015 to June 30, 2016) to ensure our
central conclusion is robust.
Our hypothesis is that in the restriction period, since the arbitrage activities are frozen,
the absolute futures-cash bases should have no causal effects on liquidity and vice versa. We
test this hypothesis using the Granger causality test, together with the impulse response
analysis. Panel B of Table 3 reports the F -statistics and p-values for all the tests pairing two
absolute bases and two spread measures for the restriction period from July 7, 2015 to June
30, 2016. In contrast to Panel A, all the F -statistics are insignificant in both directions for
both current-month and nex-month futures contracts. The results in the second restriction
period (August 3, 2015 to June 30, 2016), as presented in Panel C, further reinforce the
22For example, on July 13, 2015, after 3 p.m., all opening long position orders in the futures market were
rejected. See news at: http://cn.reuters.com/article/2015/07/13/cn-drv-idCNKCS0PN11H20150713.
23June 30, 2016 is the last date in our sample. The restrictions on these two markets are as of October
24, 2016.
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evidence that the interplay between absolute futures-cash bases and spreads is absent under
restriction. Overall, the Granger causality tests indicate that the absolute futures-cash bases
do not Granger cause liquidity and vice versa when arbitrage activities are prohibited.24
In Figures 6 and 7, we plot the impulse responses for the VAR models estimated using the
sample data in the first restriction period for the current-month and next-month contracts,
together with the IRFs in the pre-restriction period. First, it is evident that in the restriction
period, the responses of ESPR (QSPR) to shocks of ABAS1 (ABAS2 ) are not significantly
different from zero.25 The shocks of ESPR (QSPR) also contain no information about the
future movements of ABAS1 (ABAS2 ). All these results are consistent with the breakdown
of Granger causality, as documented in Panel B of Table 3. Second, we compare the IRFs
in the restriction period with the confidence intervals in the pre-restriction period. The
underlying null hypothesis in this comparison is that the IRFs in the restriction period are
indifferent from the ones in the pre-restriction period. However, we can find that the lines
for restriction period are out of the confidence intervals of responses for the pre-restriction
period for most cases, especially for the next-month contract in Figure 7, indicating rejection
of the null hypothesis. This evidence that the impulse response patterns in these two periods
are distinctly different. Third, as shown in Table 4, the IRFs in the pre-restriction period
are economically significant and comparable to the findings for the U.S. market as reported
in Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2007). However, in the restriction period, since the
mean values of IRFs are indifferent from zero and significantly different from those in the
pre-restriction period, the economic meaning thereby is negligible.
As a further test, we also compare the coefficients in the VAR models across two regimes
(pre-restriction and restriction) using the Z-test.26 Considering that the regressors in the
VAR model with four lags are likely to be highly collinear, we test the coefficient differences
24As the restriction period has more than 230 observations, the likelihood that insignificance is due to the
power issue of small sample size is trivial. Moreover, in the augmented VAR analysis below, we estimate
the model using the combined sample from two periods, further alleviating the concern of small sample bias.
We thank an anonymous referee for articulating the issue of small sample size.
25We have not plotted the confidence intervals for the IRFs in the restriction period here to make the
presentation of results clear. The results in Figures A5-A8 of the Online Appendix show that the lower
confidence intervals are always below zero and the upper confidence intervals are always above zero.
26We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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based on the VAR model with only one lag27 as follows:
yt,j = αjyt−1,j + βjxt−1,j + t,j, (5)
where j denotes the sample periods (i.e., j = 1 denotes the pre-restriction period and
j = 2 denotes the restriction period), y represents the column variable, x represents the
row variable, and  denotes the residuals. We are particularly interested in testing whether
the βs are different in the two regimes for the same set of y and x variables. This can be
achieved by the Z-test, with the statistic equals to β1−β2√
(SE(β1))2+(SE(β2))2
, where SE(βi) denotes
the standard deviation of βi.
Table 5 reports the testing results. At first glance, the patterns are in sharp contrast
in two sample periods: the estimates of β, which measure the cross effect between spreads
and absolute based, are all significantly positive in the pre-restriction period, but non of
them are significant in the restriction period. This confirms again our previous findings in
the Granger casualty tests in Table 3. The last two columns report the Z statistics and
the associated p values for the Z-test. For instance, when the y variable is QSPR, and the
x variable is ABAS1, the estimates of β are 0.022 and -0.003 in the pre-restriction period
and restriction period, respectively. The statistic of Z-test turns out to be 9.652, which is
positively significant at 1% level. This indicates that compared to the restriction period, the
effect of lagged ABAS1 on QSPR is statistically larger in the pre-restriction period. The
columns show that all of the other Z statistics are positive and significant at conventional
levels. As a result, we can conclude that the coefficients in two regimes are statistically
different and the coefficients in the pre-restriction regime are predominately larger than the
27Since all the absolute futures-cash basis and spread measures are highly autocorrelated, the independent
variables would have the multicollinearity issue, making the Z-test lacking of power (see e.g. Enders, 2015,
p.290). In order to test whether the coefficients in the two regimes are different, we have also used an
augmented VAR model with 4 lags that uses dummy variables to distinguish two regimes. We use the F-test
to test whether the coefficients of the interaction terms jointly equal to zero. Since multicollinearity influences
the individual parameter estimates but not the overall level of variance accounted for, the F-test is reliable
even in the presence of multicollinearity. As reported in Table A5 in the Online Appendix, we reject the null
hypothesis of indifference and thus confirm that the coefficients in the two regimes are statistically different.
The drawback of this F-test approach, however, is that it cannot tell the directions of the differences i.e., we
cannot know whether the coefficients are statistically larger in the restriction period or in the pre-restriction
period. With this in mind, we mainly rely on the simple version of VAR model with 1 lag to test the regime
differences by the Z-test.
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ones in the restriction regime.
< Insert Table 5 here >
Taken together, the evidence suggests that the two-way positive relation breaks down
both statistically and economically in the restriction period. We thus confirm the hypoth-
esis that the arbitrage force is the underlying mechanism that drives the interplay between
liquidity and the absolute futures-cash basis.
4.3 Controlling the market crash effect
The results show that during the restriction period, the significant two-way positive rela-
tion between market illiquidity and the absolute futures-cash basis no longer exists. One
remaining concern for this interpretation is the effect of the 2015 Chinese market crash. Lien
et al. (2013) show that when the market liquidity decreases and the absolute basis increases,
the dependence structure between these two variables may break down in an extreme case.
After the Chinese stock market crash in 2015, market liquidity significantly dropped. Table
1 shows that the effective bid-ask spread increased from 0.020 CNY in the pre-restriction
period to 0.027 CNY in the crash period and to 0.021 CNY in the whole restriction period.
Given that the market index significantly dropped (around 37%) during the market crash,
the percentage spreads experienced a larger increase while the market liquidity significantly
decreased. As a result, since the first one-six of the restriction period overlaps the crash
period, the relation between the absolute futures-cash basis and liquidity could dissipate due
to the significant decrease in market liquidity, not the absence of arbitrage activities.
To ensure our findings in the restriction period are not confounded by the market crash
effect, we conduct two robustness checks. We first conduct a Granger causality test using
the post-crash sample period. From September 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016, market conditions
became relatively stable and were much less noisy, as shown in Figure 1. However, from
Table 6, the F -statistics indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that spreads
(absolute futures-cash bases) contain information towards future absolute bases (spreads)
movements for both current month and next month contracts. We draw a similar conclusion
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from unreported results on impulse response analyses. Henceforth, our results for a more
settled market alleviate concerns regarding the market crash effect.
< Insert Table 6 here >
Furthermore, we use the index futures/cash markets in Hong Kong as a control group.28
The Hong Kong financial market is increasingly integrated with the mainland China mar-
ket, especially as a growing number of Chinese enterprises go public in the Hong Kong stock
market(e.g., Wang and Jiang, 2004; Wang, Miao, and Li, 2013).29 For firms listed in Hong
Kong but registered in mainland China (H shares), their share prices reflect operating in-
formation in mainland China, and therefore have close proximity to mainland China stock
markets. From January 2, 2012 to December 31, 2015, the correlation between the HSCEI,
which captures the performance of the 40 largest H share stocks, and the CSI 300 index is
50.9% in terms of return and 63.2% in terms of realized volatility.30
During the Chinese market crash period in 2015, as we can see in Figure 1, the HSCEI
also collapsed, dropping from 13,984 to 9,741.41 (46%). In contrast to the mainland China
markets, however, regulators in Hong Kong did not impose any restrictions on the HSCEI
futures/cash markets.31 Different regulations in these two markets, thereby, provide us with
an institutional setting to address the market crash effect further. If the disappearance of the
two-way positive relation is a result of the market crash instead of the arbitrage restrictions,
28Our analysis is in the spirit of a difference-in-difference (DID) approach, but not a formal one. We do
not employ a formal DID analysis as the typical DID analysis is used to test the difference in means while
we care about the change of joint coefficients in a VAR system, making the DID approach methodologically
difficult.
29By the end of 2015, there were 229 H share companies listed in the Hong Kong stock market, including
the Big Four state-owned banks in mainland China. The market capitalization of H share companies was
HK $ 5,157 billion, 21.11% of the total market capitalization in the Hong Kong stock market. When “Red
chips” stocks, stocks of mainland China companies incorporated outside China and listed in Hong Kong, are
also counted in, the China-related stocks had a market share of 42.15% in the Hong Kong market. Source:
HKEx Monthly Market Highlights (https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/smstat/chidimen/cd_mc.htm)
and HKEx Securities Market Statistics (https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/smstat/chidimen/cd_mc.
htm).
30We use 5-minute CSI 300 index and HSCEI data from TRTH to construct the simple realized volatility
measures at a daily frequency by taking a square root of the summation of all the 5-minute return squares
within a trading day.
31In practice, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange manages a shortable list and updates it quarterly. Short
selling is permitted only for specific stocks on the list. However, during our sample period, the ETFs on the
HSCEI were always shortable.
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we should also observe a structural break in the HSCEI futures/cash market after the Chinese
market crash, given the high similarity between the mainland China market and H share
stocks. Otherwise, the crash effect is unlikely to be the main driving force for the breakdown
of the interaction between spreads and the absolute futures-cash bases.
To test this hypothesis, we construct spreads and the absolute futures-cash basis mea-
sures for the HSCEI futures/cash markets in a similar way as for the CSI 300 futures/cash
markets.32 Similar to the CSI 300 index futures contracts, the delivery months for the HSCEI
futures also include current month, next month, and the final months of the next quarter
and the next two quarters.33 To be consistent, we only include the first two contracts in the
analysis and denote these two basis series as HKABAS1 and HKABAS2.34
In line with the analysis for the mainland China market, we estimate the VAR model
for the Hong Kong market in two sample periods: one from January 2, 2012 to May 29,
2015, and the other from July 7, 2015 to June 30, 2016. Table 7 presents the estimation
results for these two sample periods. Panel A shows that in the pre-restriction period, in the
HSCEI futures/cash markets, there is a two-way Granger causality relation between stock
market illiquidity and the absolute futures-cash bases for both the current-month and the
next-month contracts. As in the Chinese and U.S. markets, the spreads have stronger effects
on the bases for the longer-term contracts. The evidence in Panel B for the restriction period
is striking: wider bases still lead to larger spreads for both contracts due to the arbitrage-
triggered order imbalance and larger spreads also cause wider absolute futures-cash bases,
at least for the next month contract, as illiquidity impedes arbitrage and thereby the pricing
efficiency.35 Considering that the HSCEI experienced a larger drop than the CSI 300 index
32The risk-free rate is the Hong Kong Interbank Offer Rate (HIBOR), with maturities including overnight,
1-week, 2-week, 1-month, 2-months, and 3-months. The dividend yield is the difference between the (contin-
uously compounded) difference between the HSCEI total return index and the HSCEI index. For liquidity
measures, we weight the quoted spreads/effective spreads for the individual firms in the HSCEI by their
market value in the last month.
33The H-shares index futures were introduced on December 8, 2003. Its underlying asset is the HSCEI.
It is a top-10 derivatives market product in the Hong Kong market and has a trading volume comparable
to the Hang Seng Index futures. For more details on the futures contracts, we refer readers to: https:
//www.hkex.com.hk/eng/prod/drprod/hshares/hhifut.htm.
34The time series of the spread and basis measures are presented in the Online Appendix Figures A9-A10.
35The results for the F-test with dummy variables, as reported in the Online Appendix Table A6, show
that the F-statistics are all insignificant, indicating that we cannot reject the null that the coefficients are
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during the market crash, our results provide strong evidence that arbitrage activities are
still the driving force for the interplay between liquidity and pricing efficiency even during
market upheaval. The results show that the absence of arbitrage activites is the driving force
behind the break down of the two-way Granger causality relation in the Chinese market.
< Insert Table 7 here >
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the relation between the absolute futures-cash basis and liquidity
in the Chinese CSI 300 index futures/cash market from 2012 to 2016. Our main purpose is
to address the omitted variable bias. We first use the restrictions on the futures trading and
stocks short sales imposed by the regulators as a response to the 2015 Chinese market crash
as a natural experiment. We find that during this restriction period, in which the arbitrage
channel is shut off, the significant two-way relation between the absolute futures-cash basis
and liquidity in the pre-restriction period dissipates both statistically and economically.
Using the Hong Kong market as a control sample, we confirm that there is no market crash
effect driving the results. Our results suggest that the two-way positive causality relation
between the absolute futures-cash basis and liquidity is indeed casual through the arbitrage
channel, and is not due to endogeneity. Our evidence indicates that arbitrage is the force to
be reckoned with in shaping the interplay between liquidity and market efficiency.
indifferent in two regimes in the Hong Kong market.
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Table 1 Summary statistics for CSI 300 futures-cash bases and liquidity measures
Summary statistics are for the absolute futures-cash bases (in percentages relative to the cash index value),
and (in CNY) for the CSI 300 value-weighted quoted and effective spreads. ABAS1 and ABAS2 represent
unadjusted absolute bases for the two futures contracts (current month and next month). QSPR represents
the unadjusted quoted bid-ask spread. ESPR represents the unadjusted effective spread .
Panel A: Pre-restriction Period (January 2, 2012 - May 29, 2015)
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev.
ABAS1 0.407% 0.297% 0.425%
ABAS2 0.652% 0.480% 0.167%
QSPR 0.014 0.014 0.002
ESPR 0.020 0.020 0.004
Panel B: Restriction Period (July 7, 2015 - June 30, 2016)
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev.
ABAS1 2.083% 1.536% 1.893%
ABAS2 4.225% 3.584% 2.330%
QSPR 0.016 0.016 0.002
ESPR 0.021 0.020 0.002
Panel C: Crash Period (June 15, 2015 - August 30, 2015)
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev.
ABAS1 2.940% 2.232% 2.480%
ABAS2 4.752% 4.484% 3.241%
QSPR 0.019 0.018 0.003
ESPR 0.027 0.027 0.004
Panel D: Post-crash Period (September 1, 2015 - June 30, 2016)
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev.
ABAS1 1.629% 1.342% 1.384%
ABAS2 3.784% 3.140% 1.963%
QSPR 0.015 0.015 0.001
ESPR 0.020 0.019 0.003
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Table 2 Correlation matrix
ABAS1 and ABAS2 represent adjusted absolute bases for the two futures contracts (current month and next
month). QSPR represents the quoted bid-ask spread (adjusted by calender effects and time trends). ESPR
represents the effective spread (adjusted by calender effects and time trends). * and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Normal Period (January 1, 2012 - May 29, 2015)
ABAS1 ABAS2 QSPR ESPR
ABAS1
ABAS2 0.89***
QSPR 0.30*** 0.27***
ESPR 0.30*** 0.26*** 0.97***
Panel B: Restriction Period (July 7, 2015 - June 30, 2016)
ABAS1 ABAS2 QSPR ESPR
ABAS1
ABAS2 0.91***
QSPR 0.08 -0.12
ESPR 0.14* -0.03 0.90***
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Table 3 Granger causality tests
ABAS1 and ABAS2 represent adjusted absolute bases for the two futures contracts (current month and
next month). QSPR represents the quoted bid-ask spread (adjusted by calender effects and time trends).
ESPR represents the effective spread (adjusted by calender effects and time trends). F-statistics are reported
with the p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Panel A: Pre-restriction Period (January 2, 2012 - May 29, 2015)
ABAS1 ABAS2 QSPR ESPR
ABAS1 4.830*** 6.318***
(0.001) (0.000)
ABAS2 2.279* 3.422***
(0.058) (0.008)
QSPR 1.527 1.770
(0.197) (0.138)
ESPR 2.411** 2.831**
(0.050) (0.027)
Panel B: Restriction Period I (July 7, 2015 - June 30, 2016)
ABAS1 ABAS2 QSPR ESPR
ABAS1 0.444 1.713
(0.776) (0.147)
ABAS2 0.514 1.322
(0.725) (0.262)
QSPR 0.555 0.023
(0.457) (0.980)
ESPR 0.743 0.256
(0.389) (0.613)
Panel C: Restriction Period II (August 1, 2015 - June 30, 2016)
ABAS1 ABAS2 QSPR ESPR
ABAS1 0.951 1.061
(0.435) (0.376)
ABAS2 0.943 1.010
(0.439) (0.402)
QSPR 1.535 0.343
(0.216) (0.558)
ESPR 0.648 0.229
(0.421) (0.633)
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Table 4 Economic significance
This table presents economic significance in million CNY value and percentages. When the response variable
is QSPR (or ESPR), the economic significance in terms of CNY value is measured as: V alue(Spread) =
Response(Spread) × 1million × 250, where Response(Spread) is the sum of the four response coefficients
for spread in Figured 6 and 7, and 250 is the total trading days per year. The economic significance in terms
of percentage is measured as: Percentage(Spread) = Response(Spread)×1million×250AverageSpread×1million×250 , where AverageSpread is
the average spread as reported in Panel A of Table 1. When the response variable is ABAS1 (or ABAS2),
the economic significance in terms of CNY value is measured as: V alue(Basis) = Response(Basis) ×
1million× 40× 250, where Response(Spread) stands for the sum of the four response coefficients for basis
in Figure 6; the economic significance in terms of percentage can be expressed as: Percentage(basis) =
Response(basis)×1million×40×250
AverageBasis×1million×40×250 , where AverageSpread refers to the average absolute futures-cash basis as
reported in Panel A of Table 1.
Response Variables:
ABAS1 ABAS2 QSPR ESPR
ABAS1 0.085 0.1375
(1.70%) (2.75%)
ABAS2 0.047 0.085
(0.93%) (1.70%)
QSPR 4.030 4.600
(9.87%) (11.27%)
ESPR 4.000 6.500
(9.80%) (15.93%)
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Table 5 Z-test for regime differences
This table reports the Z-test results for the coefficients difference in the VAR models with only one lag. The
VAR model is Yt = αiYt−1 + βiXt−1 + t. The VAR models are estimated for the pre-restriction period,
which is from January 2, 2012 to May 29, 2015, and the restriction period, which is from July 7, 2015 to June
30, 2016. The pair-wise estimates of β and associated t-statistics are reported. Z-statistic denotes statistic
for testing the difference between two coefficients in two sample periods, and the associated p-values are in
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Spread measures as dependent variables
Pre-restriction Period Restriction Period Difference Tests
QSPR ESPR QSPR ESPR QSPR ESPR
Independent Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Z-Statistic Z-Statistic
Variable (p-value) (p-value)
Lag(ABAS1) 0.022*** 0.057*** -0.003 0.004 9.652*** 4.431***
(4.213) (4.055) (-0.490) (0.190) (0.000) (0.000)
Lag(ABAS2) 0.014*** 0.037*** -0.005 -0.006 12.952*** 6.195***
(4.473) (4.274) (-1.176) (-0.404) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel B: Absolute basis measures as dependent variables
Pre-restriction Period Restriction Period Difference Tests
ABAS1 ABAS2 ABAS1 ABAS2 ABAS1 ABAS2
Independent Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Z-Statistic Z-Statistic
Variable (p-value) (p-value)
Lag(QSPR) 0.207*** 0.170*** -0.008 -0.204 13.830*** 1.525*
(3.971) (2.961) (-0.320) (-0.686) (0.000) (0.064)
Lag(ESPR) 0.109*** 0.094*** 0.015 -0.041 3.807*** 1.727**
(4.134) (3.239) (0.372) (-0.416) (0.000) (0.042)
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Table 6 Robustness: Granger causality tests in the post-crash period
ABAS1 and ABAS2 represent the daily adjusted absolute bases for the two futures contracts (current month
and next month). QSPR represents the daily quoted bid-ask spread (adjusted by calender effects and time
trends). ESPR represents the daily effective spread (adjusted by calender effects and time trends). F-
statistics are reported with the p-values in parentheses. The time period is from September 1, 2015 to June
30, 2016.
Post-crash period (September 1, 2015 - June 30, 2016)
ABAS1 ABAS2 QSPR ESPR
ABAS1 0.651 1.760
(0.527) (0.138)
ABAS2 0.130 1.258
(0.971) (0.288)
QSPR 0.643 1.128
(0.633) (0.345)
ESPR 0.109 0.666
(0.979) (0.617)
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Table 7 Granger causality tests in the Hong Kong market
HKABAS1 and HKABAS2 represent the daily adjusted absolute bases for two futures contracts (current
month and next month) for HSCEI index of Hong Kong market. HKQSPR represents the daily quoted
bid-ask spread (adjusted by calender effects and time trends). HKESPR represents the daily effective spread
(adjusted by calender effects and time trends). F-statistics are reported with the p-values in parentheses. *,
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Pre-restriction period (January 1, 2012 - May 29, 2015)
HKABAS1 HKABAS2 HKQSPR HKESPR
HKABAS1 2.566* 2.750**
(0.053) (0.041)
HKABAS2 2.205* 3.495**
(0.086) (0.015)
HKQSPR 2.101* 7.156***
(0.085) (0.000)
HKESPR 2.466* 3.369**
(0.061) (0.018)
Panel B: Restriction period (July 7, 2015 - June 30, 2016)
HKABAS1 HKABAS2 HKQSPR HKESPR
HKABAS1 2.381* 2.870**
(0.069) (0.036)
HKABAS2 2.152* 3.201**
(0.093) (0.023)
HKQSPR 2.174* 6.480***
(0.090) (0.000)
HKESPR 1.853 4.908***
(0.137) (0.002)
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Figure 1 Cumulative returns of CSI 300 and HSCEI
HSCEI
CSI300
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
2015−01 2015−07 2016−01 2016−07
Date
Cu
m
u
la
tiv
e
 R
et
ur
n
In this figure, we plot the cumulative returns of the CSI 300 and HSCEI. The time period is from January
2, 2015 to June 30, 2016.
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Figure 2 Short sale volume
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In this figure, we plot the daily volume of aggregate short selling (billion shares) in the Chinese stock market
from January 2, 2013 to June 30, 2016. The solid vertical line denotes the date of July 7, 2015. The dashed
vertical line denotes the date of August 4, 2015.
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Figure 3 Trading volume of CSI 300 futures contracts
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In this figure, we plot the smoothed trading volumes for four contracts of CSI 300 index futures: current
month, next month, next quarter month and next two quarters month. The time period is from January 2,
2012 to June 30, 2016.
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Figure 4 Futures-cash bases for the CSI 300
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In this figure, we plot the CSI 300 index futures-cash bases for the current month and next month contracts.
The series are from January 2, 2012 to June 30, 2016. The shaded area denotes the 2015 Chinese stock
market crash period, which is from June 15, 2015 to August 30, 2015.
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Figure 5 Spread measures for CSI 300
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In this figure, we plot the CSI 300 index quoted spread and effective spread. The series are from January 2,
2012 to June 30, 2016. The shaded area denotes the 2015 Chinese stock market crash period, which is from
June 15, 2015 to August 30, 2015.
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Figure 6 Impulse responses comparsion I: current-month futures contract
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In this figure, we plot the impulse responses of ABAS1 and QSPR (ESPR) in the pre-restriction period
(January 2, 2012 to May 29, 2015) and the restriction period (July 7, 2015 to June 30, 2016). The solid
lines denote the mean response values in the pre-restriction period, and the short dashed lines are the
corresponding 95% confidence intervals based on 1,000 simulations. The long dashed lines represent the
mean response values in the restriction period.
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Figure 7 Impulse responses comparsion II: next-month futures contract
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In this figure, we plot the impulse responses of ABAS2 and QSPR (ESPR) in the pre-restriction period
(January 2, 2012 to May 29, 2015) and the restriction period (July 7, 2015 to June 30, 2016). The solid
lines denote the mean response values in the pre-restriction period, and the short dashed lines are the
corresponding 95% confidence intervals based on 1,000 simulations. The long dashed lines represent the
mean response values in the restriction period.
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Appendix A Restrictions on futures trading
In this Appendix, we briefly summarize the restrictions on index futures trading issued by
the China Financial Futures Exchange. We obtain these announcements from the official
weibo (Chinese version of Twitter) of the China Financial Futures Exchange.36 We introduce
these restrictions based on the time line of announcement dates.
July 6, 2015
Starting from July 7, 2015, transactions on the China Security Index 500 (CSI 500)37
futures is limited to 1,000 contracts per client per day for one direction of trading (either
long or short).
July 8, 2015
Starting from July 8, 2015, the margin rate for CSI 500 index futures increases from 10%
to 20% (except for the hedging position). Since July 9, 2015, the margin rate for CSI 500
index futures has increased to 30%.
July 31, 2015
Starting from August 3, 2015, for clients with speculative positions (including arbitrage
and speculation) in all the index futures (including the CSI 300 index futures), for a single
contract, cancelling more than 400 orders for a single contract or more than five trades a
day would be considered as “irregular trading.”
August 25, 2015
On August 26, 2015, the margin rates for speculative positions in the CSI 300 and SSE
5038 index futures increased from 10% to 12%. Since August 27, 2015, the margin rates
for speculative positions in the CSI 300, SSE 50 index futures increased to 15%, while the
margin rate for the long (speculative) positions in the CSI 500 index futures is increased to
15%. Starting from August 28, 2015, the margin rates for speculative positions in the CSI
300, SSE 50 index futures increased to 20%, while the margin rate for the long (speculative)
positions in the CSI 500 index futures increased to 20%.
Starting from August 26, 2015, transactions on the CSI 300, SSE 50, and CSI 500 index
futures are limited to 600 contracts per day per client for speculative positions on each
futures product.
Starting from August 26, 2015, the transaction fee for the intraday delivery (opening and
closing position in the same day) increased from 0.05h to 0.115h.
August 28, 2015
36http://weibo.com/cffexfabu.
37CSI 500 was launched on January 15, 2007, and it is designed to capture the aggregate performance of
the small-cap stocks in the Chinese stock market. The index futures (CSI 500 index futures) was launched
on April 16, 2015 by the China Financial Futures Exchange.
38SSE 50 index was launched on January 2, 2004, and it is designed to capture the aggregate performance
of the 50 stocks with the largest market capitalizations in the Shanghai stock market. The index futures
(SSE 50 index futures) was launched on April 16, 2015 by the China Financial Futures Exchange.
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Since August 31, transactions on the CSI 300, SSE 50, and CSI 500 index futures are
limited to 100 contracts per day per client for speculative positions on each futures product.
Since August 31, 2015, the margin rates for speculative positions increased to 30%.
September 2, 2015
Since September 7, 2015, transactions on the CSI 300, SSE 50, and CSI 500 index futures
are limited to 10 contracts per day per client for speculative positions on each futures product.
Since September 7, 2015, the margin rates in the CSI 300, SSE 50, and CSI 500 index
futures increased from 30% to 40% for the speculative positions and 20% for the hedging
positions.
Since September 7, 2015, the transaction fee for the intraday delivery (opening and closing
position in the same day) increased from 0.115h to 2.30h.
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